Toyota, Honda, Nissan and Suzuki Financial Analysis | IR Tracker

Toyota, Honda, Nissan and Suzuki: Revenue Growth but a 40% Collapse in Operating Profit

A financial comparison of four Japanese automakers based solely on TDnet XBRL filings, covering profitability, investment, cash flow and shareholder returns.

IRTracker

July 29, 2026

20 min read

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction — Revenue Growth, Yet Operating Profit Down 40%

This article compares Toyota Motor Corporation (7203), Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (7267), Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. (7201), and Suzuki Motor Corporation (7269) using only financial data from the companies’ earnings releases (XBRL) published on TDnet. No external data—such as share-price indicators, unit sales, regional breakdowns, or foreign-exchange rates—is used.

The coverage periods differ by company. Toyota covers FY2024–FY2026, Honda FY2022–FY2026, Nissan FY2022, FY2023, FY2025, and FY2026 (FY2024 is missing), and Suzuki FY2023–FY2026. Accordingly, a “five-year trend” is not available consistently across all four companies, and aggregate figures are presented with the number of companies for which data was available. Quarterly results are not included in the provided data, so midyear progress against full-year forecasts is difficult to calculate from the available data. This article therefore limits the comparison to forecasts versus the latest reported results.

Against that backdrop, the FY2026 picture is clear. Combined revenue for the four companies increased year on year, but operating profit fell by 40%. This was a case of higher revenue and lower profit—an exceptionally severe decline.

FY2026 total for the four companies (calculated from the provided data)

Revenue: ¥88,183.7 billion → ¥90,782.2 billion (+2.9%)
Operating profit: ¥6,721.4 billion → ¥4,032.8 billion (-40.0%)
Operating Profit Margin: 7.6% → 4.4% (-3.2 pp)
Toyota’s share of the four companies’ operating profit: 71.3% → 93.4%

Profit concentration jumped from 71% to 93% in a single year. This does not mean that “Toyota grew.” Toyota’s own operating profit also declined by 21.5%; rather, the profits of the other three companies disappeared even more rapidly.

2. Industry Trends — Scale Is Growing, but Margins Have Halved in Two Years

Toyota, Honda, and Suzuki have three consecutive periods of comparable data, allowing us to examine the underlying trend.

Three-company total (¥ billion)	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026
Revenue	70,898.3	75,550.5	78,774.4
Operating profit	7,200.3	6,651.7	3,974.8
Operating Profit Margin	10.2%	8.8%	5.0%

Revenue rose 11.1% over two periods, equivalent to an annualized growth rate of 5.4%, while operating profit declined 44.8%. The Operating Profit Margin nearly halved from 10.2% to 5.0%. The industry’s defining feature is that revenue growth continues not to translate into profit growth.

There are limitations to the aggregate analysis of Capital Expenditures (Capex) and Depreciation & Amortization (D&A). FY2026 Capex was ¥6,059.7 billion for Toyota, ¥612.0 billion for Honda, and ¥377.4 billion for Suzuki, for a three-company total of ¥7,049.1 billion; Nissan’s Capex is not included in the provided data. D&A was disclosed only for Suzuki in FY2023 (¥177.2 billion) and FY2024 (¥197.2 billion). A four-company total and the Capex-to-D&A Ratio are therefore difficult to calculate from the available data.

FY2026 Property, Plant and Equipment (PP&E) figures are available for all four companies. Of the ¥26,596.1 billion total, Toyota accounts for ¥17,067.3 billion, or 64.2%. The time-series data also highlights clear differences in capital-allocation stance. Honda’s PP&E was nearly flat, rising just 3.8% from ¥3,079.4 billion in FY2022 to ¥3,196.3 billion in FY2026, equivalent to annual growth of 0.9%. Nissan’s PP&E increased 3.8% from ¥4,365.9 billion to ¥4,530.4 billion over the same period. By contrast, Suzuki’s PP&E surged 58.9% (16.7% annually) from ¥1,134.5 billion in FY2023 to ¥1,802.1 billion in FY2026, clearly indicating an investment phase. The resulting picture is two companies focused on maintaining their existing asset base and one company moving decisively toward capacity expansion.

3. Profitability Comparison — The Key Difference Was Conversion into Profit, Not Growth

After specifying the comparison periods, we present CAGR (compound annual growth rate) alongside the latest YoY figures. CAGR is calculated as the nth root of (ending value ÷ beginning value) minus one.

Metric	Toyota<br/>(FY2024→26, 2 years)	Honda<br/>(FY2022→26, 4 years)	Nissan<br/>(FY2022→26, 4 years)	Suzuki<br/>(FY2023→26, 3 years)
Revenue CAGR	+6.0%	+10.6%	+9.3%	+10.7%
Revenue YoY (FY2026)	+5.5%	+0.5%	-4.9%	+8.0%
Operating profit CAGR	-16.1%

All four companies achieved revenue CAGR of at least 6% annually, so each expanded its scale. The decisive difference was profit conversion. Among Honda, Nissan, and Suzuki, which all grew revenue at roughly a 10%-plus annual rate, only Suzuki increased operating profit, at 21% annually. Honda’s operating result deteriorated from a ¥1,213.4 billion profit to a ¥414.3 billion loss, a negative swing of ¥1,627.7 billion.

Nissan maintained a ¥58.0 billion operating profit, but its income before taxes was a ¥440.3 billion loss. The gap between operating profit and pretax income reached ¥498.3 billion, indicating substantial losses below the operating line. The breakdown is not included in the provided data, but the items may include restructuring-related costs or asset-valuation charges. Net loss attributable to owners of the parent narrowed 20.5%, from ¥670.8 billion in the prior period to ¥533.0 billion. The reduction in the loss should nevertheless be noted.

4. A Deeper Look at Earnings Structure — A Double Pressure from Higher Costs and Surging R&D

FY2026	Toyota	Honda	Nissan	Suzuki
Gross Profit Margin	Difficult to calculate*	16.5%	12.8%	25.5%
Operating Profit Margin	7.4%	-1.9%	0.5%	9.9%
SG&A ratio

*Toyota does not disclose gross profit, and a simple subtraction does not reconcile with operating profit.

Toyota: ¥50,684.9 billion - (cost of revenue) ¥39,141.4 billion - (SG&A) ¥4,697.5 billion = ¥6,846.0 billion ≠ operating profit of ¥3,766.2 billion (the ¥3,079.8 billion difference includes expense items not separately disclosed in the data)

This ¥3,079.8 billion gap suggests that the revenue and expense figures include items related to Toyota’s financial-services business. It is therefore inappropriate to compare Toyota’s gross margin with those of the other companies on a like-for-like basis. This article consequently uses only Operating Profit Margin and SG&A ratio for Toyota.

Honda, by contrast, discloses cost of revenue, and the subtraction reconciles with operating profit.

Honda FY2026: Gross profit = ¥21,796.6 billion - ¥18,193.4 billion = ¥3,603.2 billion (Gross Profit Margin: 16.5%) / ¥3,603.2 billion - SG&A of ¥2,476.8 billion - R&D Expenses of ¥1,540.6 billion = -¥414.2 billion ≈ operating loss of ¥414.3 billion

Honda’s Gross Profit Margin moved from 20.5% (FY2022) to 19.7%, 21.6%, 21.5%, and finally 16.5%. With revenue increasing just 0.5%, cost of revenue rose 6.9%, reducing gross profit by ¥1,060.8 billion, from ¥4,664.0 billion to ¥3,603.2 billion. This was compounded by a sharp increase in R&D Expenses, from ¥1,099.4 billion to ¥1,540.6 billion, or 40.1%. The R&D-to-Revenue Ratio rose 2.0 percentage points, from 5.1% to 7.1%. The simultaneous 5.0-point deterioration in gross margin and 2.0-point increase in the R&D ratio provide an accounting explanation for Honda’s swing into the red. R&D Expenses also rose 95.8% over four years from ¥787.0 billion in FY2022, nearly doubling; this may indicate that front-loaded investment in electrification and software is weighing on earnings.

Nissan’s Gross Profit Margin also declined consistently, from 16.1% in FY2022 to 16.2%, 13.4%, and 12.8%. Its SG&A ratio, however, improved by 0.8 percentage points, from 13.1% to 12.3%, indicating progress on cost reduction. The data suggest that the problem lies at the cost-of-revenue stage rather than in SG&A.

Suzuki maintained a high Gross Profit Margin of 24.8%, 26.3%, missing data, and 25.5%. Its SG&A ratio of 16.1% was the highest among the four companies, but its substantial gross profit absorbed the burden, resulting in the top Operating Profit Margin of 9.9%. This was nevertheless down 1.1 points from 11.0% in FY2025, so the possibility that profitability has passed its peak warrants attention.

5. Capital Expenditures and Capital Intensity — Assets Are Being Replaced and Reconfigured

FY2026	Toyota	Honda	Nissan	Suzuki
Capital Expenditures (Capex) (¥ billion)	6,059.7	612.0	Not disclosed	377.4
Capital Intensity (Capex-to-Revenue)	12.0%	2.8%	—	6.0%
Capex-to-D&A Ratio	Difficult to calculate

Toyota’s 12.0% Capital Intensity is exceptionally high compared with the other companies. However, this may reflect investment in financial and leased assets, so it cannot be directly compared as a measure of the burden of manufacturing-related investment. Indeed, Capex of ¥6,059.7 billion exceeded Operating Cash Flow of ¥5,472.9 billion, producing a negative difference of ¥586.8 billion.

The movement in Intangible Assets is particularly noteworthy. Honda’s balance fell 30.3% (¥341.3 billion) from ¥1,126.0 billion in FY2025 to ¥784.7 billion in FY2026. Nissan’s also declined substantially, from ¥216.5 billion to ¥167.7 billion, a decrease of 22.5%. The sharp declines may include the effects of impairment and amortization, and the fact that Honda’s timing coincides with its worsening cost ratio is suggestive. Suzuki moved in the opposite direction: Intangible Assets expanded from ¥7.8 billion in FY2023 to ¥185.4 billion, while PP&E rose 58.9%, indicating simultaneous expansion on both fronts.

6. Cash Flow Analysis — Assessing the Quality of Earnings Power

FY2026 (¥ billion)	Toyota	Honda	Nissan	Suzuki
Operating Cash Flow	5,472.9	1,135.2	794.6	717.5
Operating Cash Flow Margin	10.8%	5.2%	6.6%	11.4%
Investing Cash Flow	-1,520.3

Dividend payments were estimated from per-share data because none of the four companies directly disclosed the amount paid.

Estimated period-end shares outstanding = equity attributable to owners of the parent ÷ BPS | Toyota: ¥39,918.8 billion ÷ ¥3,062.82 ≈ 13.03 billion shares → total dividends ≈ 13.03 billion shares × ¥95 ≈ ¥1,238.1 billion (estimated Dividend Payout Ratio: 32.2%, consistent with the disclosed 32.1%)

Applying the same method produces approximately ¥272.5 billion for Honda, ¥88.7 billion for Suzuki, and zero for Nissan, which paid no dividend. Total dividends for the four companies are therefore estimated at approximately ¥1,600.0 billion. This is only an approximation based on period-end shares outstanding, and Total Shareholder Returns (cash) cannot be determined because Toyota’s and Honda’s buybacks were not disclosed.

The quality of cash flow reveals a clear two-tier structure. Suzuki and Toyota generated Operating Cash Flow Margins in the double digits, at 11.4% and 10.8%, respectively, while Honda and Nissan were in the 5%–6% range, at 5.2% and 6.6%. Honda’s Operating Cash Flow fluctuated sharply, from ¥1,679.6 billion in FY2022 to ¥2,129.0 billion, ¥747.2 billion, ¥292.1 billion, and ¥1,135.2 billion. Changes in sales-finance receivables and working capital may have contributed to this volatility.

Nissan recorded negative Free Cash Flow for two consecutive periods, at -¥217.5 billion and -¥119.6 billion, while cash and cash equivalents declined by ¥386.1 billion, from ¥1,961.5 billion to ¥1,575.4 billion. Operating Cash Flow of ¥794.6 billion was insufficient to cover Investing Cash Flow of -¥914.3 billion, and Financing Cash Flow was also on the inflow side at +¥51.9 billion. The fact that Nissan is not self-funding its cash needs is the clearest risk factor among the four companies.

7. Capital Efficiency and Financial Soundness

FY2026	Toyota	Honda	Nissan	Suzuki
ROE	10.1%	-3.5%	-10.9%*	13.8%
Equity Ratio	37.8%	35.3%	24.2%*	51.0%
Net D/E	Difficult to calculate

*Nissan’s ROE and Equity Ratio are not disclosed. They were calculated using equity attributable to owners of the parent, obtained by subtracting Non-Controlling Interests from total equity: ¥4,958.5 billion in FY2025 and ¥4,799.0 billion in FY2026.

Net D/E is difficult to calculate for all four companies because interest-bearing debt is not disclosed for any company other than Suzuki, and Suzuki’s period-end cash balance is also undisclosed. Suzuki’s gross D/E, calculated by dividing interest-bearing debt—current debt of ¥263.3 billion plus non-current debt of ¥485.2 billion, or ¥748.5 billion in total—by equity attributable to owners of the parent of ¥3,382.0 billion, is 0.22x. Together with an Equity Ratio of 51.0%, this indicates the most conservative balance sheet among the four companies.

The three-year ROE trends are sharply contrasting. Toyota declined from 15.8% to 13.6% and then 10.1%, a 5.7-point reduction over two years. Honda fell from 9.3% to 6.7% and then into negative territory at -3.5%. Suzuki remained high and stable at 14.6% and 13.8%. Toyota’s ROE decline reflects the simultaneous decrease in Net Income Attributable to Owners of the Parent, from ¥4,944.9 billion to ¥3,848.0 billion, and increase in equity, from ¥34,220.9 billion to ¥39,918.8 billion, or 16.7%; expansion of the denominator also had an impact. Conversely, Honda’s total equity declined from ¥13,005.8 billion in FY2024 to ¥12,148.0 billion, while its Equity Ratio fell 7.3 points from 42.6% to 35.3%. The simultaneous recognition of losses and erosion of capital merits close attention from the standpoint of financial flexibility.

The Effective Tax Rates also include unusual figures. Honda reported a ¥403.3 billion pretax loss and ¥50.2 billion of income-tax benefit, producing a 12.5% rate. Nissan reported a ¥440.3 billion pretax loss but recognized ¥86.2 billion of income-tax expense, resulting in a -19.6% rate. This may reflect a mismatch between jurisdictions where losses were recognized and jurisdictions where taxes were payable, as well as judgments concerning the recoverability of deferred tax assets. Equity Method Income also diverged sharply: Honda recorded a ¥162.0 billion loss, while Toyota recorded income of ¥552.7 billion. Suzuki’s Non-Controlling Interests ratio of 18.6% was far above the 2.7% reported by the other companies, suggesting that partially owned consolidated subsidiaries make a substantial contribution to earnings. The relationship between consolidated operating profit of ¥622.9 billion and net income attributable to owners of ¥439.2 billion also appears to reflect this structure.

Stock-split caution: Honda carried out an approximately 1-for-3 stock split in FY2024, while Suzuki carried out an approximately 1-for-4 split in FY2024. Per-share figures for periods before the splits (Honda FY2023 and earlier; Suzuki FY2023) are based on pre-split shares and cannot be compared directly. Adjusted figures are shown below where applicable.

FY2026	Toyota	Honda	Nissan	Suzuki
EPS (¥)	295.25	-106.06	-152.58	227.69
BPS (¥)	3,062.82	3,035.91	1,372.56	1,753.03
Dividend per share (¥)	95.00	70.00

Toyota: EPS declined 19.3% over two years, from ¥365.94 to ¥359.56 and then ¥295.25, while the dividend per share increased 26.7%, from ¥75 to ¥90 and then ¥95. As a result, the Dividend Payout Ratio rose 11.7 points from 20.4% to 25.0% and then 32.1%. DOE remained broadly stable at 3.2%, 3.4%, and 3.3%, indicating continued stable returns based on capital. BPS steadily increased 20.6%, from ¥2,539.75 to ¥3,062.82.

Honda: On a split-adjusted basis (divided by three), EPS was ¥137.03 in FY2022, followed by ¥136.62, ¥225.88, ¥178.93, and -¥106.06. The dividend per share was ¥40, ¥40, ¥68, ¥68, and ¥70. The nominal change from “¥120 to ¥70” does not represent a dividend cut; on a split-adjusted basis, the company had actually been increasing its dividend. FY2026 nevertheless ended in a net loss, making the Dividend Payout Ratio impossible to calculate, while DOE was maintained at 2.4%.

Suzuki: On a split-adjusted basis (divided by four), EPS rose from ¥113.80 in FY2023 to ¥138.40, ¥215.66, and ¥227.69, equivalent to a three-year CAGR of 26.0%. The dividend per share also increased from an adjusted ¥25 to ¥41 and then ¥46. Suzuki’s disclosed FY2024 dividend of ¥122 is consistent with the pre-split basis; the adjusted amount is ¥30.5, consistent with a Dividend Payout Ratio of 22.0%. The payout ratio remained stable in a range of 19%–22%, with dividend increases driven primarily by EPS growth. Suzuki is the only one of the four companies to have continued delivering “profit-growth-driven dividend increases.”

Nissan: The dividend per share was ¥5 in FY2022 and ¥10 in FY2023, but Nissan paid no dividend in FY2025 or FY2026. BPS rose from ¥1,310.74 in FY2023 to ¥1,419.78 before declining to ¥1,372.56 in the latest period. Nissan conducted ¥139.3 billion of Share Repurchases / Buybacks in FY2025, resulting in Total Shareholder Returns (cash) of ¥139.3 billion, but buybacks were zero in FY2026 and shareholder returns were completely suspended.

9. Earnings Forecasts — A Two-Way Split Between Declining Profit and a Return to Profitability

The forecasts in the provided data are for the next full fiscal year and do not include quarterly results, so progress rates are difficult to calculate. We therefore examine direction based on the comparison with the latest reported results.

(¥ billion)	Toyota	Honda	Nissan	Suzuki
Reported revenue → forecast	50,684.9 → 51,000.0	21,796.6 → 23,150.0	12,007.8 → 13,000.0	6,292.9 → 6,800.0
Revenue change	+0.6%	+6.2%	+8.3%	+8.1%
Reported operating profit → forecast	3,766.2 → 3,000.0

The four companies’ forecast operating profit totals ¥4,270.0 billion, up 5.9% from FY2026 actual operating profit of ¥4,032.8 billion. Against combined forecast revenue of ¥93,950.0 billion, the implied Operating Profit Margin is 4.5%, virtually unchanged from 4.4% in FY2026.

The pattern is clearly divided. The two profitable companies, Toyota and Suzuki, are forecasting lower profit, while the two companies with losses or low profitability, Honda and Nissan, are forecasting a recovery. Toyota is projecting a third consecutive period of lower operating profit, reaching ¥3,000.0 billion in the FY2027 forecast, 44.0% below ¥5,352.9 billion in FY2024. Its forecast Operating Profit Margin of 5.9% is less than half the 11.9% recorded in FY2024. Suzuki’s forecast Operating Profit Margin of 8.4% remains the highest among the four even after factoring in the projected decline, suggesting that the profitability ranking will remain unchanged. Honda’s forecast margin of 2.2% and Nissan’s 1.5% remain thin even after their expected returns to profitability.

10. Key Areas to Monitor Going Forward (Qualitative Considerations)

The following discussion goes beyond the scope of the provided data and represents analysis without direct quantitative support.

Profit-and-loss impact of electrification investment: Honda’s R&D-to-Revenue Ratio rose from 5.1% to 7.1%, while the absolute amount nearly doubled over four years. This may indicate that investment in electrification and software has reached a stage where it is directly affecting the income statement. At the same time, Intangible Assets declined 30.3%, which may suggest that the expected future cash flows of some investments were reassessed. R&D Expenses for Toyota, Nissan, and Suzuki are not included in the provided data, making comparison difficult.

FX Impact: All four companies are understood to have overseas operations, and their yen-denominated revenue and profit may be affected by currency movements. Honda’s FY2026 revenue increased only marginally, by 0.5%, while cost of revenue rose 6.9%; this structure may include the effects of foreign-exchange movements and input costs. However, specific FX sensitivity is difficult to calculate from the available data, so no definitive conclusion should be drawn.

Inventory trends: Inventory as a percentage of revenue was 10.1% for Toyota, 11.6% for Honda, 8.1% for Nissan, and 11.0% for Suzuki. Suzuki is particularly notable: inventory increased 120.7%, from ¥313.8 billion in FY2023 to ¥692.6 billion in FY2026, far exceeding the 35.6% increase in revenue over the same period. This may reflect proactive inventory accumulation accompanying production and sales expansion, but if demand falls short of expectations, it could also create future pressure for discounts or inventory write-downs. Honda’s inventory rose 2.5% while revenue increased only 0.5%, indicating slower turnover. Conversely, Nissan reduced inventory 2.7% in line with its 4.9% revenue decline, suggesting inventory management consistent with a smaller operating scale.

11. Conclusion

まとめ

- **Toyota**: Toyota has an overwhelming earnings base, accounting for 93.4% of the four companies’ operating profit. However, its Operating Profit Margin declined 4.5 points from 11.9% in FY2024 to 7.4%, while ROE fell from 15.8% to 10.1%. BPS increased 20.6% as capital accumulation progressed, and the Dividend Payout Ratio rose from 20.4% to 32.1%. The next-period forecast calls for a 20.3% decline in operating profit, creating a contrast between “scale and stable shareholder returns” and “continued deterioration in profitability.” - **Honda**: Despite achieving a four-year revenue CAGR of 10.6%, Honda’s Gross Profit Margin deteriorated 5.0 points from 21.5% to 16.5%, and the company swung to a ¥414.3 billion operating loss. The R&D-to-Revenue Ratio rose to 7.1% while Intangible Assets declined 30.3%. The Equity Ratio fell from 42.6% to 35.3%. Split-adjusted dividends were maintained at ¥70, with DOE at 2.4%, demonstrating continued commitment to shareholder returns. A return to profitability is forecast for the next period, but the forecast Operating Profit Margin is only 2.2%. - **Nissan**: Although Nissan recorded an operating profit of ¥58.0 billion, pretax income was a ¥440.3 billion loss, implying ¥498.3 billion of losses below the operating line. Free Cash Flow was negative for two consecutive periods, cash declined by ¥386.1 billion, and dividends remained suspended. Its Equity Ratio, calculated on the basis described above, was 24.2%, the lowest of the four. The decline in Gross Profit Margin from 16.2% to 12.8% is a structural issue. - **Suzuki**: Suzuki simultaneously achieved strong profitability and financial soundness, with a 9.9% Operating Profit Margin, 13.8% ROE, and 51.0% Equity Ratio. Operating profit CAGR was 21.1%, and Net Income Attributable to Owners of the Parent CAGR was 25.7%. The 58.9% expansion in PP&E and 120.7% increase in inventory are key areas for future verification. The distinctive capital structure, including a Non-Controlling Interests ratio of 18.6%, also requires consideration. - **Common theme**: The four companies’ combined Operating Profit Margin declined from 7.6% to 4.4% and is forecast to remain only 4.5% in the next period. Whether revenue growth can be converted into profit is the clearest dividing line in the financial data.

This article is for informational purposes only, based on publicly available financial data (TDnet XBRL filings). It is intended as a financial analysis resource and does not constitute investment advice.